Background
The pro-Taiwan independence argument:
1. According to the UN Charter, all nations have a right to self-determination. The population of Taiwan represents a nation different from that of Mainland China – different history, different values. The fact that Taiwan and China share the same ethnic group doesn’t matter – Canada and the United States, New Zealand and Australia, Germany and Austria are all examples of countries where large parts of the population at one point shared common roots, or still do.
2. The Qing government ceded Taiwan and other islands to the Empire of Japan in 1895. After World War Two Japan renounced their claim to Taiwan but did not specify to whom Taiwan belonged, or who should take over the administration.
3. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never controlled Taiwan.
4. The PRC was not a signatory to the Treaty of Taipei in 1952.
The argument for reunification with China:
1. The People’s Republic of China is the successor state to the Qing government, as well as to the KMT government that had ruled China until 1949 and has inherited control of all areas previously under the control of those states or governments.
2. Yes, the Qing government ceded Taiwan, but the Treaty of Taipei in 1952 nullified all previous treaties signed by Imperial Japan with regards to China, including the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.
3. Yes, Taiwan has had de facto independence for seven decades, but the PRC has tolerated this for the sake of peace as long as no de jure independence is declared.
4. Yes, the PRC was not a signatory to the Treaty of Taipei in 1952, but the Republic of China has since seized to be the legitimate government of China and is not recognised anymore as the legitimate government of China by the vast majority of countries in the world. See Point #1.
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I have come up with a solution to the Taiwan issue that should make everyone reasonably happy, except maybe the arms manufacturers and the aggressive faction of the Deep State in America.
The solution is as follows:
Taiwan and China agree to forge closer economic and other ties for a ten-year period – things like re-admitting tour groups, exchange students, cooperation in academic and other scientific fields, music and theatre groups from both sides of the Straits of Taiwan holding performances on the other side.
Then, the big thing: After ten years, a referendum is held in Taiwan with two options: reunification with China, or independence.
Taiwanese who dedicate themselves to independence will have ten years to convince the population that independence, and looser ties with China, is the best option for Taiwan.
China will also have ten years to invest in Taiwan and use the proverbial carrot to cultivate the Taiwanese population for the idea of reunification.
This should lead to a flourishing of cooperation in scientific, medical, technological, and cultural fields. Small-business owners and big companies will all make money. New economic opportunities would benefit workers in China and Taiwan.
If things go well for the pro-reunification faction, Taiwanese would not be willing to give up all the advantages they had accrued over the preceding decade. More than 51% of the adult population would vote for Taiwan to become a province of China with certain special benefits, such as its own flag (which will hang together with the flag of the People’s Republic), as well as its own monetary unit.
On the other hand, if things go right for the pro-independence faction, Taiwan can get its de jure independence after almost a hundred years, minus of course certain advantages that had accumulated in the previous ten years.
Problem is convincing China to accept the possibility that the majority of Taiwanese would choose independence. The question can also be asked what guarantee Taiwan would have that China won’t still attempt to incorporate Taiwan by force if the majority of Taiwanese reject reunification. Would America stand on the side-lines for ten years only to suddenly be Taiwan’s friend again?
If after ten years the majority of Taiwanese adults decide it would be more beneficial to re-join the Motherland, the case would be closed for Taiwanese independence. They would then have had their opportunity to state their case, and the people would have decided otherwise.
This also applies to the other side. If China could give Taiwan an idea of the benefits of a closer relationship for ten years, but the majority of Taiwanese still choose to have their independent state – which they would by then have enjoyed in practice for almost a hundred years anyway, then China must simply give up on the idea of reunification. Just ask Germany, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Mexico, France, Spain, Portugal, Indonesia, Serbia, and Britain, who have all had to cede territory at some point in their histories. All survived and thrived afterwards. It’s not the end of the world.
For the process to work, rules would need to be laid down, and guarantees would need to be given. Taiwan and China can negotiate the rules, but who would ensure compliance? Who would ensure that guarantees are honoured?
WEDNESDAY, 9 NOVEMBER 2022
Fact of the matter is that Taiwan has a dual identity – the anachronistic identity of Republic of China, and the de facto but not de jure identity of Republic of Taiwan. Only time will tell if the latter would eventually replace the former, or whether both would be swept away in a wave rolling in from the People’s Republic of China.
TUESDAY, 6 DECEMBER 2022
It is not difficult to see that China is the party with the most to lose. As things stand now, Taiwan is independent in practical terms, but there is a possibility that China could regain control of the island. If such a referendum goes against reunification, China loses, as does perhaps one-fifth of Taiwanese who support the idea of reunification.
If the numbers are against Beijing from the start, why would they participate in such an exercise in democracy, and undertake to accept the results?
Would it work if Taiwan is willing to pay a price for formal independence?
In the Taiwan Strait, between the Chinese coast and Taiwan, lie a number of pieces of valuable property. About 10 kilometres east of the Chinese city of Xiamen, and more than 180 kilometres from the island of Taiwan, lies the group of islands known as Jinmen (lower red arrow). The Matsu archipelago (top red arrow) is about 190 kilometres from Taipei, and about 20 kilometres from the Chinese coast. The Penghu Islands (blue arrow) are just 50 kilometres away from Taiwan, and 150 kilometres east of the Chinese mainland. Would the government in Taipei be willing to give up these island groups in order to gain formal independence for Taiwan, and other smaller islands on its west and east coasts? Will Taiwan further pledge not to host any US or NATO bases? (They would, of course, be free to forge defensive alliances with Japan and the Philippines.)
Or – and we’re just playing around with possibilities here – Taipei keeps the islands in the Taiwan Strait, but Beijing takes control of two islands on the east coast of Taiwan, namely Green Island and Orchid Island (top and bottom green arrows, respectively).
Another possibility: Taiwan gives up control over the two islands in the Philippine Sea and the two island groups closest to the Chinese coast but retains control over the Penghu Island group. In this way, China gets precious pieces of land where they have not had land in more than a hundred years, but they lose any possibility of gaining control over Taiwan; and Taiwan loses a degree of security, but gains formal independence, and all the benefits that go with it. Would the Taiwanese public be in favour of such a settlement? Would the government in Beijing find this acceptable?
Whatever the details, the bottom line is that Taiwan would pay for a referendum that is likely to end in formal independence by giving up several strategically valuable pieces of land, and with that a degree of security.
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